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PICKING UP THE PIECES OF GROKSTER
I. Introduction
This note provides a rounded discussion about the ramifications
of MGM v. Grokster,1 a case in which the distribution of peer-to-peer
file-sharing software was deemed not to constitute contributory or
vicarious copyright infringement. In discussing the Grokster case it is
important to deal not only with the legal technicalities of the decision,
but also with the larger societal implications raised by the case. What
are the practical effects of the Grokster ruling? How should judicial
doctrine reflect these realities? Does our current system of copyright
law provide an adequate legal response to file sharing? Opponents of
the ruling would argue that unless Grokster is overturned, copyrights
in digital music recordings will be too vulnerable and difficult to
protect. At this point the theoretical dominos would begin to fall. (1)
If record companies cannot protect their content, they will not earn
profits from producing and distributing sound recordings. (2) Record
companies will therefore begin investing their resources elsewhere,
rather than in new creative content. (3) Record companies will sign
fewer artists. (4) The decrease in signed artists will inherently
decrease progress in the musical arts. (5) Artists who are still signed
will receive less compensation for their creations, and will therefore
have less incentive to create.
The above arguments, however rational, presume a traditional
system of sound recording distribution. Such arguments take for
granted the assumption that an incentive to sign with a record
company is directly proportional with the incentive to create new
music. It is important to point out, however, that peer-to-peer file
sharing has drastically altered this equation. Although musicians still
undoubtedly strive to be signed by major record labels for their
marketing capabilities, this approach is no longer necessary with
respect to reproduction and distribution. Artists can now
inexpensively distribute their music online making it easily accessible
to file-sharers. With the peer-to-peer structure, access is no longer
stifled by the expense and inconvenience of physical media.
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D.
Cal. 2003) ("Grokster I"); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Nos. 03-
55894, 03-55901, 03-56236, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 (9th Cir. Aug. 19, 2004).
("Grokster IF'). Throughout this article "Grokster " refers specifically to the Central
District of California decision and "Grokster I" refers to the Ninth Circuit ruling on
appeal. As these two dispositions of the case are identical in many respects the distinction
is not always necessary, and in those instances the italicized term "Grokster" is used
without an accompanying numeral.
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Accordingly, the primary arguments supporting the Grokster
ruling involve two main elements. First, holding the file-sharing
software distributors liable would protect only an antiquated business
model, not progress in the field of music. The innovation encouraged
by increased access to musical works made possible by the peer-to-
peer model far outweighs the innovation encouraged by the current
structure of the recording industry. Therefore, the law in this area
should allow and foster a shift in the status quo. Under the Grokster
ruling, the antiquated business model of the recording industry is
more likely to be replaced or at least modified by allowing the peer-
to-peer model to thrive. If, on the other hand, Grokster had come out
differently, the record industry would have much less incentive to
change its traditional distribution format for the benefit of artists and
consumers alike.
Second, and perhaps most relevant to the legal rationale
underlying Grokster, holding the distributors of peer-to-peer file-
sharing software liable would unduly inhibit technological progress.
Were it not for technologies like the Grokster software, the shift
towards online music distribution might have come much more
slowly. Because the Internet allows for easier access to a wider array
of music than traditional outlets of distribution, this technological
shift will ultimately stand to benefit both the consumer and the artist.
Allowing copyright holders to simply shut down a useful
technological tool for enhancing this access is clearly contrary to
public policy. Thus, in this context, innovation in the fields of
technology and music are directly related, as the enhanced access
made possible by new file-sharing technologies inevitably expands the
public domain, which may in turn foster innovation in the field of
music.
The constitutional foundations of copyright law are rooted in the
aspiration "to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts."2 In
the file-sharing context, it is a balance of progress in these areas, as
represented by the fields of music and technology, that must
ultimately be found and implemented in the law. Thus, although
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Today the term "science" evokes a broad meaning
that includes the field of technology, whereas the term "useful arts" would seem to
encompass the field of music. However, at the time the Constitution was drafted the terms
"science" and "useful arts" held different connotations. Historically speaking, the term
"useful arts" refers to technological inventions generally covered by patents, and the term
"science" indicates "knowledge and learning" as embodied in works of authorship covered
by copyrights. Julia E. Cohen et. al., Copyright in a Global Information Economy, at 28
(2002). As used in this article, the term "technology" frequently refers to file-sharing
software, which can be covered by both patents and copyrights.
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innovation in music would undoubtedly benefit most by online music
distribution that also compensates the artist, a legal approach
providing for such compensation should not unduly inhibit innovation
in technology. If the underlying principles of Grokster are abandoned,
new technologies may be halted before their best non-infringing uses
are found.
Practically speaking, the core issue in Grokster was essentially
the same issue that confronted federal courts in the cases of Napster
and Aimster,4 among others Specifically, Internet users at the present
time can easily obtain and make copies of copyrighted digital sound
recordings without compensating the artists who created those
recordings. Although this core issue has been addressed in prior
decisions, the specific peer-to-peer file-sharing model offered by
Grokster and other online music distribution software 6 raises its own
unique issues as well. Most importantly, these newer models do not
maintain a centralized server by which all digital audio files are
indexed. Thus, the attenuated relationship between distributor and
user renders the Grokster software more analogous to a "product" as
opposed to a "service." This important difference becomes
particularly relevant within the current framework of copyright law,
largely because the staple article of commerce doctrine adopted by
the Supreme Court in Sony7 becomes more readily applicable. The
actual sharing of copyrighted files by end users is undeniably illegal
under the current legal framework. Nevertheless, the legality of
providing software that allows such activity remains questionable.
This is where the unique importance of Grokster comes to light.
In this article I will explain why a new approach to copyright law
is necessary in order to meet the challenges introduced by Grokster
and other peer-to-peer technologies. The constitutional policy
foundations of copyright law, namely to promote progress in science
3. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). This Ninth
Circuit ruling is referred to as both "Napster" and "Napster II' in this article. The lower
court decision from the Northern District of California, A&M Records v. Napster, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), is referred to solely as "Napster L" In discussing the system
itself the term "Napster" is used without italics.
4. In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
5. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Recording Industry Association of America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc.,
180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir 1999); Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-line Communi-
cation Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
6. These other hubs include, for example, Kazaa and StreamCast. The liability of
StreamCast was also at issue in the disposition of the consolidated Grokster case. Grokster
II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 5.
7. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
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and useful arts,8 will not be adequately served by the current
approach. Part II of this article briefly outlines the current social,
technological, and economic issues informing the Grokster decision.
Part III covers the major judicial approaches to file sharing leading up
to and including Grokster. Parts IV and V discuss both the
inadequacy of the current judicial approach to file sharing and a
revised approach to the problem. Part VI discusses why a
fundamentally new approach to copyright law is necessary in the file-




Before Napster,9 most consumers who wished to listen to music
would simply go to the store and purchase whatever tangible medium
was necessary. Over the last 100 years this medium has constantly
changed, beginning with sheet music and followed by piano rolls,
phonograph records, analog tapes, and eventually compact discs. 10
The problematic issues raised by the Grokster case are due to the
drastic shifts in technology that have occurred over the last five to ten
years. These technological advances allow (1) the serial copying of
digitized music without significant degradation in sound quality, (2)
instant access to virtually all digitized music through the Internet, (3)
negligible distribution costs, and (4) the potential for "space shifting"
among multiple forms of media." These issues also confronted the
courts in Napster and Aimster.
Although the use of Grokster and StreamCast software involves
many of the same issues as Napster and Aimster, the unique peer-to-
peer structure of the software involves at least two distinctive, and
very critical components, namely: (1) the lack of a centralized server
containing an index of available files, and (2) a more tenuous
relationship between the distributor of the software and the file-
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. See discussion, infra Part III.B.
10. Radio offers a somewhat different scenario, in which the listener trades a certain
degree of choice in exchange for low cost and convenience. The legal approach to radio
and other broadcast media has been based largely on private solutions like ASCAP and
BMI. Looking at these solutions can be helpful in formulating a new approach to the
quasi-broadcast structure of the Internet. See note 152 and accompanying text, explaining
a similar approach proposed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
11. The particular issue of "space shifting" was addressed at length by the Ninth Cir-
cuit in the Diamond case. 180 F.3d at 1072.
sharer. These two distinctions have a lesser impact on the actual
method of music distribution than on the legality of the
technologies. 2 By developing the structure of its software and its
marketing materials around the law set forth in Sony, 3 Grokster has,
by necessity, brought the contours of contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement into sharp focus.
B. Societal Context
Prior to the unveiling of Napster's peer-to-peer file-sharing
model, the distinction between intellectual and physical property was
relatively unimportant to the average consumer of music. Purchasing
the physical object, whether it was a record, tape, or CD, provided
one with the ability to listen. The object itself contained the value,
because without the physical medium there was no possibility of
hearing the music. Although Napster magnified the distinction
between intellectual and physical property for those in the business of
music distribution, such distinctions were largely ignored, defied, or
14entirely lost on the average consumer. For years the public had
purchased "the CD" or "the record" rather than simply "the music."
One purchased access to the music, but after Napster access was free.
Apparently, such traditional notions connecting the tangible medium
to its true value die hard.
Although undeniably significant, the intangible nature of
intellectual property has not been the only factor leading to the
widespread popularity of file sharing. 5 The public perception of fair
use, the clear advantages of the new technology, as well as negative
perceptions of the record industry have also shaped the file-sharing
trend.1 6 For instance, sharing and copying music among friends
without authorization has been widely practiced and accepted for
decades despite its apparent illegality under the Copyright Act. 7
12. An Internet user can arguably accomplish no more with Grokster than with Nap-
ster, but these two technical distinctions allow the Grokster software to fall more com-
fortably within the scope of Sony, which applies to articles of commerce capable of sub-
stantial non-infringing uses. 464 U.S. at 442. See discussion infra Parts III and IV.
13. http://www.grokster.com/us/terms/; http://www.grokster.com/aboutus.html.
14. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Ideas & Trends: Anarchic E-Commerce; Online Davids
vs. Corporate Goliaths, N.Y. TIMES, August 6, 2000, § 4, at 1.
15. At the time Napster was shut down in July 2001, approximately two years after
being introduced, there were reportedly over 70 million registered users of the system.
Matt Richtel, Judge Grants A Suspension Of Lawsuit on Napster, N.Y. TIMES, January 24,
2002, at C4.
16. Harmon, supra note 14.
17. See Amy Harmon & John Schwartz, Despite Suits, Music File Sharers Shrug Off
Guilt and Keep Sharing, N.Y. TIMES, September 19, 2003, at Al; 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
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Also, the novelty and superiority of such broad and easy access has
acted as a significant draw.' 8 In addition, the notion that only record
companies, not creative artists, benefit from most "legitimate" music
sales has tempered many of the negative moral implications attached
to file sharing. 9 And of course, the relatively low risk of actually
getting caught for file sharing has facilitated its popularity. 2° In short,
consumers have found a number of ways to justify their actions.
Since Grokster I, the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") has launched a campaign to "educate" the public about
the economic impact of file sharing.2' This education has primarily
taken the form of advertisements, instant messaging to file-sharers,
the implementation of counter-piracy technologies, and, perhaps
most notably, serial lawsuits against individual file-sharers. 22 Although
this campaign has been widely criticized,2i indicators show that it has
been somewhat successful.24 Nevertheless, it remains impractical to
sue every individual file-sharer, and the focus of such efforts has been
primarily to deter current and potential file sharers. Thus, assuming
that Grokster and similar technologies continue to operate, the
ultimate success of the RIAA's tactics remains to be seen. It should
be noted, however, that at the time of this writing there is evidence
that file sharing continues to detract from music industry profits.2n
Another issue to be confronted in the file-sharing context is the
widespread "hacker" phenomenon. This phenomenon, which involves
a combination of both societal and technological issues, need not be
discussed in great detail. It should suffice to say that any technological
(1996). It should be noted that the Audio Home Recording Act made certain forms of
consumer copying legal in 1992. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1008 (1996).
18. See John Schwartz, Despite Blocks, Napster Users Can Still Get Protected Files,
N.Y. TIMES, March 6, 2001, at C1.
19. See Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle, N.Y.
TIMES, September 14, 2003, § 1 at 1.
20. This trend may subside as the recording industry continues to file lawsuits against
file-sharers. See Benny Evangelista, Millions Deleted Downloads, S.F. CHRON., November
5, 2003, at B1.
21. See Amy Harmon, In Fight Over Online Music, Industry Now Offers a Carrot,
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2003, § 1 at 1.
22. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Song Sharers Get an Instant Scolding; Record Firms Use
Pop-Up Messages to Fight Piracy, WASH. POST, April 30, 2003, at El; Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Software Bullet Is Sought to Kill Music Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, § 1 at 1.
23. See, e.g., Carrie Kirby, RIAA Goes After 532 Unnamed File Sharers: Industry Un-
fazed by Earlier Legal Setbacks, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2004, at B4.
24. See, e.g., Evangelista, supra note 20.
25. Although many factors have been cited for the struggling recording industry, file-
sharing is among them. See, e.g., Carolyn Said, Tower Records Hits a Financial Sour Note;
Pioneer Music Retailer Files for Chapter 11, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 10, 2004, at B1.
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measures introduced to protect copyrighted works are bound to find
highly skilled opponents.26 Furthermore, the anonymous forum of the
Internet makes copyright enforcement in this area significantly more
difficult than in others." On the other hand, technologies that are able
to prevent the average user (i.e., non-hackers) from circumventing
copyright protection measures are likely to be deemed successful by
those implementing such measures. In addition, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") currently offers significant
legal protection to copyright owners against hackers.28
C. Economic Context
The primary economic players involved in the debate over file
sharing can be categorized as follows: (1) the recording industry, (2)
artists, (3) technology developers, and (4) consumers. Historically, the
recording industry and technology companies have shared a similar
economic interest in maintaining the current copyright system. 29 This
trend has been shifting, however, and now the music industry seems
to hold the most direct interest in maintaining the current framework
of copyright law?0 In developing an appropriate legal framework for
online music distribution it is important to note that the interests of
the recording industry do not necessarily coincide with the interests of
31 32
the latter three groups. Indeed, the interests of artists," consumers,
26. See, e.g., Greg Miller, Film Industry Wins Ruling in DVD Suit; Motion Pictures:
N.Y Judge Tells Web Sites to Stop Distributing Software That Allows Users to Copy the
Discs. But is it Too Late?, L.A. TIMES, January 21, 2000, at C1.
27. This difficulty was recently compounded by the D.C. Circuit decision denying the
RIAA access to the identities of file-sharers through their Internet Service Providers. See
RIAA, Inc. v. Verizon Internet Services, Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
28. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (2003).
29. Earlier advances in audio media focused primarily either on enhanced sound
quality or convenience (i.e., portability, durability, etc.), but did not offer the capability of
serial copying without degradation in sound quality. Thus, the relationship between the
recording industry and audio media developers was largely symbiotic. For an in-depth
discussion of this phenomenon, see generally Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception
of Copyright Law Survive the Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future,
46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 98-130 (2002).
30. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS at 200 (1st ed. 2002).
31. E.g. Neil Strauss, File-Sharing Battle Leaves Musicians Caught in Middle, N.Y.
TIMES, September 14, 2003, § 1 at 1 (pointing out that many musicians do not approve of
the record industry suing their fans, some believing that file sharing is advantageous to
their careers).
32. See generally Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law's Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 397 (2003) (arguing that copyright law does not adequately recognize the separate
interests of the consumer, emphasizing the areas of consumer autonomy, communication
and sharing, and creative self-expression).
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technology developers,33 and of creative progress in general 4 are often
at odds with those of the music industry as it now functions.
Il. The Evolution of a Judicial Approach to File Sharing
A. Sony and the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
Although Sony35 clearly did not address the specific issue of file
sharing, any discussion of contributory copyright infringement in the
file-sharing context must include a discussion of this seminal Supreme
Court decision. Sony involved a lawsuit brought by members of the
television broadcasting industry against Sony, a manufacturer of
VCRs, for contributory copyright infringement.36 The Court held that
Sony could not be held liable as a contributory infringer because the
VCR was an article of commerce capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.37 In setting forth the legal foundations for
contributory copyright infringement, 38 the Court in Sony emphasized
the need for "an ongoing relationship between the direct infringer
and the contributory infringer at the time the infringing conduct
occurred."39 The Court also stated that constructive knowledge of a
customer's ability to use equipment to directly infringe copyrights
would not be sufficient to establish secondary liability.40
Perhaps most significantly, at least in the file-sharing context, the
Supreme Court adopted the "staple article of commerce doctrine"
from patent law.41 This doctrine stands for the proposition that the
sale of an article of commerce "capable of substantial noninfringing
uses" does not constitute contributory copyright infringement. 4' As
written, Sony appears to provide a blanket defense under which the
Grokster software clearly falls. However, not all jurisdictions have
33. See LESSIG, supra note 30 (arguing that the recording industry currently "de-
mands the right to veto new innovation" by leveraging its control over content).
34. Id. at 215-16.
35. Sony v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
36. Id. at 419-20.
37. Id. at 442.
38. Id. at 434-38. As the Supreme Court delineated the contours of "secondary liabil-
ity" with respect to copyright infringement, one noticeable aspect of its approach was the
apparent interchangeability between contributory and vicarious liability. These contours
have subsequently developed into distinct theories of liability. See, e.g., Napster, 239 F.3d
at 1019-24. See also infra Part III.B-D.
39. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437 (citing Justice Holmes' opinion from Kalem Co. v. Harper
Brothers, 222 U.S. 55 (1911)).
40. Id. at 439.
41. Id. at 442.
42. Id.
adopted this broad interpretation. Perhaps most notably, the Ninth
Circuit reads the staple article of commerce doctrine to simply invoke
a heightened knowledge requirement for those articles of commerce
capable of substantial noninfringing use.43 The policy issues
implicated by the staple article of commerce doctrine as applied in
Sony are central to the Grokster ruling, and to the future of file
sharing in general.
B. Napster. File Sharing Hits the Courts
Although a number of subsequent court decisions have shaped
the judicial approach to contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement in the Internet context, most notably the 
Netcom, 4
Diamond,45 and MP3.com46 cases, Napster was the first case to deal
specifically with the mass sharing of digital music files.47 In Napster, a
number of record companies (including, ironically, Sony Music
Entertainment, Inc.) sued the operator of a system that permitted
such file sharing.48 The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court finding
that Napster would likely be found liable for contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement. 49 Despite the staple article of
commerce doctrine, the Napster court held that contributory liability
is appropriate when the contributory infringer has actual knowledge
of the direct infringement: ° Furthermore, Napster held that the staple
article of commerce doctrine does not apply with respect to vicarious
copyright infringement .
1. Contributory Infringement
In Napster, the Ninth Circuit applied the traditional standard for
contributory copyright infringement. Specifically, "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as
43. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21. See infra Parts Ill.B, IV.B.
44. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
45. R.I.A.A. v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).
46. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
47. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1004.
48. Id at 1011.
49. The Ninth Circuit ruling was in the context of an appeal from a preliminary in-
junction against Napster, which required plaintiffs to show a likelihood of success on the
merits of the case, that they would suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of hard-
ships tipped in their favor. Id. at 1013.
50. Id. at 1020.
51. Id. at 1022.
52. Id. at 1019.
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a 'contributory' infringer."53 However, by applying this standard
within the context of file sharing, Napster augmented the scope of the
doctrine and introduced a number of key nuances.
a. The Knowledge Requirement
One important aspect of contributory infringement, as it was
dealt with in Napster, is the knowledge requirement. Citing Sony, the
Ninth Circuit refused to impute knowledge of infringement to the
operators of the Napster file-sharing system "merely because the
structure of the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted
material." 4 Rather, Napster required that knowledge be "linked to
demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system."55 Comparing this
approach to that of the Supreme Court in Sony, there are two main
focal points.
First, knowledge of a specific act of direct infringement is
required.5 6 General knowledge that infringement is likely to occur, or
even that it is in fact occurring, will not be sufficient to satisfy the
knowledge requirement in the file-sharing context.57 Second, Napster
requires a temporal nexus between this specific knowledge and the
ability to block the infringement.58 This requirement drastically
reduces the number of cases that constitute contributory
infringement, particularly in the Internet context, because it
essentially requires the ability to monitor user activity.
Although the Ninth Circuit took a step back from the broad
application of secondary liability imposed by the Northern District of
California in Napster I, Napster H arguably narrowed the staple
article of commerce defense from Sony quite drastically. In Sony, the
Supreme Court offered a blanket defense to contributory copyright
infringement when an infringing article of commerce is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.59 The Napster court, on the other
hand, appeared to offer only a heightened knowledge requirement in
53. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d at 1162).
54. Id. at 1021 (citing Sony, 464 U.S. at 436).
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371).
57. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the Northern District of California ruling
that, "the law does not require knowledge of 'specific acts of infringement."' Id. at 1020-
22.
58. The Ninth Circuit stated that, "if a computer system operator learns of specific
infringing material available on his system and fails to purge such material from the
system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringement." Id. at 1021.
59. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
such cases.6° Needless to say, this interpretation would considerably
weaken the staple article of commerce doctrine. However, another
interpretation of Napster is possible.
As noted above, the Ninth Circuit recognized a "clear distinction
between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct
in relation to the operational capacity of the system., 61 Maintaining
this distinction is critical to a proper application of Sony. In other
words, if Napster had been found liable solely because of its conduct
in relation to the file-sharing system, e.g., maintaining a centralized
server containing an index of available copyrighted files, this finding
would arguably be consistent with Sony. Instead, Napster de-
emphasized the distinction by imposing liability based on Napster's
mere propagation of the system combined with its knowledge of
infringing uses.
b. The Material Contribution Requirement
The Napster court spent little time discussing the element of
material contribution, and instead deferred to the District Court
63
ruling.62 However, even the discussion in Napster I is rather sparse.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmation of Napster I perpetuates an ad hoc
approach to this particular element of the contributory infringement
analysis. Few guideposts are offered. For example: (1) a defendant
materially contributes if it would be difficult to infringe without the
defendant's services;6' (2) a defendant must act as more than a
"passive conduit" for infringing activity to establish a material
contribution;6' and (3) providing proprietary software, search engine,
servers, and means of establishing a connection between users'
computers is deemed a material contribution in the Internet context,
as is providing software, hardware, and phone lines needed for
uploading and downloading copyrighted material. 66 These ambiguous
guidelines appear to establish a relatively low threshold for finding
material contribution in the Internet context.
60. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-22.
61. Id. at 1020.
62. Id. at 1022.
63. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 919-21.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 920.
66. Id. (citing Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
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2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
Although the Sony court essentially treated contributory and
vicarious infringement interchangeably, 67 Napster applied them as two
separate theories of liability.68 The Napster approach involves a much
simpler, analysis for vicarious infringement than for contributory
infringement. In the Ninth Circuit, vicarious infringement exists when
a defendant (1) derives a direct financial benefit from the
infringement and (2) has the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity.69 The Ninth Circuit found that Napster derived a
financial benefit from the direct infringement taking place through its
system, because the ability to infringe plaintiffs' copyrights acted as a
draw to the Napster web site.7° Furthermore, Napster had the ability
to supervise and control the infringing activity by selectively limiting
user access and through its ability to purge infringing files from the
system." It is important to note that in finding it likely that Napster
would be held liable for vicarious copyright infringement,7 the Ninth
Circuit did not apply Sony's staple article of commerce doctrine.73
C. Aimster. A True Revision of Sony
Aimster, decided in the Seventh Circuit just two days prior to
Grokster I, involved an Internet service that like other file-sharing
systems allowed users to search and download files that had been
uploaded by other users. 4 Although Aimster's own server never
contained the infringing files, its service provided the facilities by
which downloaders were "matched" with uploaders.75 It was this
76function that allowed users to locate desired files. Needless to say,
this service was used to swap copyrighted digital audio files, which led
to a lawsuit filed by members of the recording industry. 7 In affirming
the lower court's preliminary injunction against Aimster for
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, the Seventh
Circuit held that an Internet music service must have actual
67. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 note 17.
68. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-24.
69. Id. at-1022.
70. Id. at 1023.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1024.
73. Id. This approach is arguably within the Ninth Circuit's authority under Sony. 464
U.S. at 435 n.17.
74. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 645.
substantial non-infringing uses to benefit from the staple article of
commerce doctrine.78
The main points of distinction emanating from the Aimster
decision involve (1) an outright rejection of Napster's interpretation
of Sony;79 (2) a requirement that technologies have actual substantial
non-infringing uses in order to benefit from the Sony doctrine;s° and
(3) a requirement that Internet file-sharing services capable of both
infringing and non-infringing uses must prove that it would be
disproportionately costly to reduce the infringing uses in order to
avoid liability.8 Thus, Aimster marks a significant shift away from
both Sony and Napster.
D. Grokster. The Last Straw?
The Grokster ruling from the Central District of California,"' and
its affirmation in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,"' appropriately
followed the precedent of Sony and Napster. Grokster involved peer-
to-peer file-sharing software ("P2P Software") with capabilities
similar to the Napster and Aimster systems, but which did not utilize
a centralized server. The Ninth Circuit found that Grokster and
StreamCast (the "Software Distributors") were not liable for
contributory infringement because their activity failed to meet both
the knowledge requirement 84  and the material contribution
requirement.n Furthermore, the court firmly established the temporal
nexus requirement introduced in Napster, holding that liability for
contributory copyright infringement requires knowledge of specific
acts of direct infringement at a time when the defendant materially
contributed to such direct infringement. 86 The court also found that
78. Id. at 653.
79. Id. at 649. Judge Posner read Napster to hold that actual knowledge of specific
infringing uses was sufficient to overcome Sony's defense to contributory liability for
technologies capable of substantial non-infringing uses. Napster is clearly at odds with
Sony under this interpretation. Once again, however, this may not be the most accurate
interpretation of Napster. See Parts III.B, IV.B.
80. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. Sony required only that the technology be "capable" of
substantial non-infringing uses in order to avoid liability. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit directly contradicts the language of Sony.
81. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. Although the Seventh Circuit found no substantial non-
infringing uses for the Aimster system, Judge Posner set forth this new standard in dicta.
This dicta is explicitly limited to Internet file-sharing services.
82. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
83. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471.
84. Id. at 18-19.
85. Id. at 19-20.
86. Id. at 18.
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the Software Distributors were not liable for vicarious copyright
infringement because they did not have the right and ability to
supervise the infringing conduct.87
The primary distinction between Grokster and prior cases
involving mass file sharing is quite simple: the defendant prevailed in
Grokster. Thus, the Grokster case provides us with our first glimpse of
a potential "outer boundary" of secondary copyright liability as
applied to mass file-sharing technologies. Although the decentralized
file-sharing context undoubtedly raised a number of novel issues, the
Grokster decision stands for the same essential policy considerations
raised in Sony, specifically, a copyright owner should not have the
ability to shut down a technology when that technology is capable of
substantial non-infringing uses.s8 If we view Grokster as correctly
decided, the decision should be analyzed with respect to at least two
major issues. First, what are these legal boundaries? Second, are they
sufficient and appropriate boundaries? This subsection will address
the first of these two questions. 89
In evaluating the legal boundaries set forth in Grokster, a basic
understanding of the technology and its relationship to unauthorized
digital copying is essential. The software at issue in Grokster ("P2P
Software") allows users to connect to an independent peer-to-peer
network not controlled by the Software Distributors. ° The P2P
Software also provides an interface which allows users to select,
upload, and download digital audio and other files 91 directly from
other users' hard drives to their own.9 Thus, as was the case in
Napster, users connected to the network through Grokster and
StreamCast have the ability to exchange digital audio files
"seamlessly." 93 In fact, from the user's standpoint, the basic features
of the P2P Software are all analogous to the system shut down by the
Ninth Circuit in Napster.94 However, with Grokster and StreamCast
neither the digital files to be downloaded nor the names of the files
are stored on a centralized server. Napster, on the other hand,
87. Id. at 26.
88. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
89. For a discussion of the second, see infra Part IV.D.
90. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 10. Grokster licenses FastTrack
technology from Sharman Networks to connect users, while StreamCast uses its own
version of the open-source Gnutella code, called Morpheus.
91. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1029. In addition to digital audio, the software




maintained a list of available files which was deemed the "axis of the
file-sharing network's wheel."" This difference was critical to the
outcome of the Grokster decision. Without such an axis, the Software
Distributors were deemed not liable.
As with the other file-sharing cases, the central legal issue in
Grokster was whether the Software Distributors could be held liable
for either contributory or vicarious copyright infringement when
Grokster and StreamCast users downloaded copyrighted sound
recordings without authorization.9 As was the case in Napster,
liability for both contributory and vicarious copyright infringement
required direct infringement by a third partyY7 Direct infringement, in
turn, required both copyright ownership by the plaintiff and
unauthorized copying by another party.98 In Grokster, the presence of
direct infringement by at least some users was undisputed by the
parties.9 With respect to the remaining boundaries of secondary
liability, Grokster presents a number of unique issues not covered by
the cases discussed above. These issues will be addressed in turn.
1. Contributory Infringement
As discussed above, contributory copyright infringement in the
Ninth Circuit requires both knowledge of direct infringement and a
material contribution to that direct infringement.'0° As interpreted by
the Grokster court, knowledge in this context means actual
knowledge of the infringing acts at a time when the defendant
materially contributes to the direct infringement. °11  This
interpretation is derived from the Ninth Circuit decision in Napster,°2
which applied a higher knowledge standard when the direct
infringement involves an article of commerce capable of substantial
non-infringing uses.tm In such cases, merely constructive knowledge of
direct infringement will not constitute contributory copyright
infringement.l 4 Similarly, actual knowledge of direct infringement at
95. Id. at 1039-40.
96. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 4.
97. Id. at 12.
98. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
99. Id
100. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 12.
101. Id at 18.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id.
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a time when the defendant is not contributing to that infringing
activity will not constitute contributory infringement.'°5
Evidence presented by the plaintiffs in Grokster indicated that
the Software Distributors were in fact aware that users had been
directly infringing copyrights and that they would continue to do so.0
However, Grokster and StreamCast were deemed capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, namely exchanging public domain or
authorized sound files, text files, software applications, and digital
images. 1°7 Thus, following Napster, contributory infringement required
specific knowledge of infringement at a time when the Software
Distributors materially contributed to the infringement.'O, This
heightened "temporal nexus" requirement could have been critical to
the Software Distributors' defense, because at the time of direct
infringement they had no control over the infringing use of the
software.' °9 However, the Grokster court ultimately found no material
contribution at all,1  rendering the heightened knowledge
requirement much less significant.
Regarding the element of material contribution, the Grokster
court applied key language from the Napster decision."' In Grokster,
the Ninth Circuit articulated the element of material contribution as
providing the "site and facilities for infringement, followed by a
failure to stop specific instances of infringement once knowledge of
those infringements is acquired." '112 As was the case in Napster, the
Grokster court viewed distribution of software that merely allows
users to infringe very differently from facilitating infringement at the
time of the infringement. It is the users of Grokster and StreamCast
who provide access to the infringing files, not the Software
Distributors. 3 Because Grokster and StreamCast maintained no
centralized server, had no control over the user networks themselves,
and had no information regarding specific file transfers at the time
they were made, they were not deemed to have materially
contributed to any direct copyright infringement."
105. Id. at 18-19.
106. For example, Grokster was marketed as "the next Napster." Grokster 1, 259 F.
Supp. 2d at 1036.
107. Id. at 1035-36.
108. Grokster 11, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 18.
109. Id. at 18-19.
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. at 22.
114. Grokster 11, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 23. It should be noted, however, that
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2. Vicarious Copyright Infringement
The Grokster court examined vicarious copyright infringement in
a typical manner, requiring both a financial benefit deriving from the
direct infringement and the right and ability to supervise the
infringing activity. "5 Although Grokster and StreamCast distributed
P2P Software free of charge, they were deriving a financial benefit
116through advertising revenue. However, they did not have the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activity itself."7 Thus, the
Software Distributors were not found liable for vicarious
infringement.
11 8
The plaintiffs argued that Grokster and StreamCast had at their
disposal certain measures to minimize direct copyright
infringement. 1 9 Such measures included filters that would screen out
copyrighted song titles and digital watermarking that would allow for
the recognition and blocking of copyrighted songs.'2 However, the
Ninth Circuit made it clear that the ability to change the underlying
architecture of the P2P Software did not constitute the "ability to
supervise" the users' infringing conduct.12' The court explained that
requiring alterations to the software itself might be a remedy for
vicarious infringement, but not a means for establishing such liability
in the first place. 22
IV. The Inadequacy of Current Judicial Approaches:
A Closer Look at the Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine
The Grokster case serves as an important indicator that judicial
approaches to file sharing under current copyright law are insufficient
Grokster did maintain a connection to the user's software in order to communicate
advertisements. This point was stressed by the plaintiffs on appeal, in connection with
language from Sony that requires an "ongoing relationship" between direct infringer and
contributory infringer in order to find contributory infringement. Sony, 464 U.S. at 437.
115. Grokster 1, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1043.
116. Id. at 1044. Once again, the nature of Grokster's advertising structure provided
the primary basis for plaintiffs' argument that an "ongoing relationship" existed between
Grokster and direct infringers. Sony based its discussion of secondary liability on this
principle of an ongoing relationship. 464 U.S. at 437. However, under its Ninth Circuit
interpretation, Sony only applies to contributory infringement, not to vicarious
infringement. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 24.
117. Grokster I, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 26.
118. Grokster I, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
119. Id. at 1045.
120. Id.
121. Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 29.
122. Id.
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to serve copyright's original purpose. While Napster and Airnster
showed that current copyright law could be used to stifle incredibly
important new technologies, Grokster shows that these new
technologies can remain available for use by those who would deny
artists fair compensation for their creative works. Both of these
outcomes fail to adequately promote progress in science and the
useful arts, as the Constitution requires of copyright law.
It is important to note that this failing should not be attributed
solely to the judiciary. The courts have traditionally deferred to
Congress, believing that steps taken by the legislature would achieve
an appropriate constitutional balance in this area.1 3 Thus, courts have
treated themselves as bound to recognize copyright's exclusive right
of distribution, the limited applicability of the Audio Home
Recording Act ("AHRA"),1 24 and the strict anti-access provisions of
the DMCA, among other important provisions. Some of these
interpretations have been warranted, and some perhaps not.
However, if copyright law is rooted in the Constitution and fails to
meet its purpose, is it not the role of the judiciary to recognize and
correct the problem? This subsection deals with the ultimate effect
that these judicial interpretations could have on innovation both in
the field of technology and in music.
A. Sony Revisited
At its core, Sony advocates a balance between two distinct
groups of innovators. Put simply, the first group consists of innovators
who "own" particular copyrighted content, where the second group
consists of the innovators who do not own that content. The
Copyright Act was naturally intended to protect the former category
of innovators. The Sony decision, however, emphasized the
importance of the second group. Although this distinction may at first
seem elementary, Sony shows us just how important it is to the future
of innovation.
Sony represents a balance between these two groups as it existed
in 1984. However, in reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court
offered an undeniably loose interpretation of the Copyright Act.
Nothing in the Copyright Act of 1976 refers to either contributory
copyright infringement or the staple article of commerce doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the introduction of VCRs
constituted a shift in technology that required a more nuanced
123. See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 500; Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1046.
124. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010 (1992).
approach. More importantly, the Court sought to limit the amount of
control copyright owners could exercise over the development of new
technologies, even when the exclusive rights of those copyright
owners were threatened. Appropriately, the new approach taken in
Sony left more room for the advancement of technology and took
into greater account the reasonable expectations of consumers.
On the other hand, although Sony stands for these important
policy considerations, it does not necessarily follow that the specific
standard the Court set forth will remain appropriate indefinitely. For
instance, Sony's language exempting from liability those technologies
"merely capable of substantial non-infringing uses" seems untenable
in the age of file sharing. Later courts have implicitly recognized this
problem, although their own altered approaches have arguably been
no more satisfactory. The implications of these later approaches will
be discussed in turn.
B. Making Sense of Napster
If Sony unduly favored new technology over the rights of
copyright owners, Napster appears to do just the opposite. Although
the outcome reached by the Ninth Circuit was arguably consistent
with the holding of Sony, the emerging doctrine seemed to raise a
number of problems. This phenomenon can be explained by two
potential lines of interpretation.
The first line of interpretation focuses on the Ninth Circuit's
explicit recognition of a "clear distinction between the architecture of
the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation to the
operational capacity of the system."' ' Insofar as the Napster court
maintained this important distinction, its own interpretation of Sony
seems accurate. That is, although the mere proliferation of the
Napster system itself would not have established liability under
Sony,'26 Napster's subsequent conduct in relation to the system's
infringing users did.1 27 This subsequent conduct should not fall within
the scope of Sony at all because it does not constitute an "article of
commerce." Although the Ninth Circuit could have found Napster
liable following this line of interpretation, subsequent language in the
opinion indicates that the court may have followed another path, one
that was inconsistent with Sony. 18
125. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020.
126. Id. at 1019.
127. Id. at 1022.
128. This latter path was how Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit read Napster, as
evidenced by his own opinion in Airster. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649.
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As the functionality of the Napster system depended on the
maintenance of a centralized server, the system and the service were
essentially intertwined. Thus, in order to shut down the service, the
Ninth Circuit would have to shut down the entire system. However,
instead of maintaining the critical distinction between "the
architecture of the Napster system and Napster's conduct in relation
to the operational capacity of the system," the Ninth Circuit simply
applied the staple article of commerce doctrine to both.129
Furthermore, instead of offering a blanket defense to Napster as a
technology capable of non-infringing use, the Ninth Circuit simply
heightened the knowledge requirement upon such a finding." Thus,
ironically, by "over-applying" the staple article of commerce doctrine
to a service, Napster may have actually weakened Sony in order to
arrive at the appropriate outcome.
As reinforced by Judge Thomas's interpretation of Napster, set
forth in Grokster II, requiring a temporal nexus between knowledge
of direct infringement and the ability to stop that infringement may
be an appropriate threshold approach to contributory infringement in
the file-sharing context.' This approach automatically implicates
service-oriented systems like Napster and Aimster, but not true
"articles of commerce" like the Grokster and StreamCast software,
VCRs and copy machines.' 32 Thus, although the outcome of Napster
may well have been consistent with Sony, its application of the staple
article of commerce doctrine was not. If left unchecked, however, this
misapplication could have a profound impact on technological
innovation. Whether or not Napster was correctly decided, the mere
fact that such a powerful and useful technology was shut down by
copyright owners should raise serious questions concerning the law in
this area.
C. Aimster: Continuing the Struggle Against Sony
The Aimster system, like Napster, could readily be categorized
as a service as opposed to an article of commerce. This finding, again,
129. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21.
130. Id. at 1021.
131. Supra note 100.
132. In fact, this heightened knowledge requirement may serve as an appropriate basis
for establishing the existence of a "service," as opposed to an "article of commerce."
Indeed, Grokster II emphasized the "integrated service" qualities of the Napster system as
distinct from the Grokster and StreamCast software. 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 17471 at 20.
Another possible test for finding a "service" would be the ability to supervise and control
the infringing activity. This latter standard is an element of vicarious liability in the Ninth
Circuit. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022.
would render a strict application of Sony unnecessary and
inappropriate. Although the Seventh Circuit recognized the
distinction between services and products, the court ultimately did
not take this approach.'33 As was the case in Napster, Aimster tweaked
the Sony standard in order to arrive at the appropriate outcome.134
However, Aimster's subsequent limitation of Sony differs greatly
from the heightened knowledge requirement imposed by Napster.
135
Although purporting to respect a balance between progress in
technology and progress in music, 36 the Aimster approach is clearly at
odds with Sony. As such, it raises the same policy questions as the
outcome in Napster.137 Although a shift from Sony's broad language
may well be appropriate considering our current technological
environment, Aimster's particular approach does not adequately
promote balanced progress in the fields of technology and music.'-
D. Grokster
Although the Grokster ruling is arguably consistent with both the
letter of Napster and the spirit of Sony, one critical question remains:
are these legal boundaries appropriate in the context of mass file
sharing? Answering this question requires us to shift our focus away
from the law as applied to the facts of Grokster, and toward its effect
on future innovation. As mentioned in the introduction, the Grokster
and StreamCast software allows users to copy and distribute millions
of complete copyrighted works without compensating the creators of
those works. If we as a society believe that compensation fosters in-
novation in music, Grokster should not be upheld. However, if Grok-
ster is overturned, copyright owners will have shut down yet another
extremely useful technology capable of substantial non-infringing
uses. This outcome is also untenable, and the law has reached an im-
passe. It follows that judicial interpretations can do no more for copy-
right law in the face of file sharing. New tools are necessary.
133. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 648-49. The ambiguity concerning whether the court was
applying Sony was not present in Ainster as it was in Napster.
134. Id.
135. Judge Posner explicitly rejected the Napster approach to Sony as he understood
it. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Grokster II, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
17471 at 17 n.9.
136. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649 (stating that in Sony, "[tlhe Court was unwilling to allow
copyright holders to prevent infringement effectuated by means of a new technology at
the price of possibly denying noninfringing consumers the benefit of the technology").
137. See supra Part IV.B.
138. See infra Part V.
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V. A New Judicial Approach is Necessary
Judicial approaches to copyright law should always consider the
law's constitutional underpinnings. Sony managed to accomplish this
in its own 1984 context. However, if the judiciary is to be responsible
for interpreting copyright law consistently with the Constitution, a
more appropriate judicial standard will be required in the context of
file sharing. That said, the policy behind the staple article of
commerce doctrine set forth in Sony should remain fully intact.
A. The New Standard
In Sony, the sale of an "article of commerce" capable of
substantial non-infringing uses, by definition, could not constitute
contributory copyright infringement.'39  Instead of outright
exoneration, distributors of such articles14° should gain only a
rebuttable presumption of non-infringement. If plaintiffs can
successfully show that current infringing uses of the product outweigh
its non-infringing uses,' defendants must show that measures to
eliminate or reduce infringing uses would be disproportionately
costly. 42 In determining whether the cost is disproportionate,
however, remedial measures that would impair non-infringing uses of
the article should not be considered.
43
B. The Scope and Effects of a New Judicial Standard
The shortcomings of relying on a purely judicial approach to
copyright law in the area of file sharing are significant, and will be
discussed in more detail below.' Nevertheless, the courts will
undoubtedly play an integral role in solving the problems raised by
innovative technologies capable of both infringing and non-infringing
139. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
140. This approach may also involve a narrower definition of an "article of commerce"
to exclude services like Napster and Aimster, while including products like the Grokster
software. An ability to supervise and control the infringing activity, one element of
vicarious liability, could serve as the basis for a definition of a "service."
141. This approach is similar to that taken by the Aimster court, 334 F.3d at 653, but is
less deferential to copyright holders. By requiring plaintiffs to meet a higher initial
standard to rebut the presumption of non-infringement, and by considering both actual
non-infringing uses as well as the non-infringing capabilities of an article of commerce, this
approach more appropriately reflects the policy foundations of Sony.
142. A version of this "disproportionate cost" approach was adopted by the Seventh
Circuit in Aimster. 334 F.3d at 653.
143. Posner's opinion does not discuss how the finding of disproportionate costs
should be determined. Some judicial discretion is no doubt in order, but the non-infringing
uses of a technology must be protected by any judicial standard in this area.
144. See infra Parts V.B, VI.
uses.'45 Gaps in legislation are inevitable, and the courts must provide
an adequate safety net for such circumstances. This safety net,
however, must remain consistent with the Constitution. The current
technological environment created by file sharing warrants a
measured limitation of Sony, but no solution should defy the
important policy considerations that led to its holding. The test
outlined above attempts to do just that.
Standing as somewhat of a compromise between Sony and
Aimster, this test strikes a more appropriate balance between the
innovators of technology and the innovators of music in a number of
ways. First, under this test, an article of commerce capable of
substantial non-infringing uses may subject its distributors to liability.
This outcome was not possible under Sony, and clearly favors
copyright holders. To counterbalance this effect, the test places a high
burden of proof on the plaintiffs. By requiring copyright holders to
prove that actual infringing uses outweigh both actual and
potential non-infringing uses,'46  this standard would give
innovative technologies more protection than is the case under
Aimster.
If plaintiffs are able to prove that the infringing uses of an article
of commerce outweigh its non-infringing uses, we move to the second
145. In her article on the Grokster case, Pamela Samuelson argues that this role is best
served by leaving the staple article of commerce doctrine from Sony unaltered. Pamela
Samuelson, What's at Stake in MGM v. Grokster?, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Feb.
2004, at 16. Samuelson emphasizes the unsuitability of the courts to determine the
appropriate course for technological innovation and the relative clarity of the "substantial
non-infringing uses" standard. Id. at 16, 19. Samuelson makes a number of compelling
arguments, many of which are reflected in this article. The fact remains, however, that the
current Sony standard is largely unfair because it allows primarily infringing technologies
to thrive. The balancing test outlined in this article still provides "breathing space" for
technological innovation, but it does so without unduly compromising the main purpose of
contributory liability, namely to deter the development of infringing technologies.
Furthermore, with respect to the simplicity of Sony, deciding whether non-infringing uses
are "substantial" is not necessarily simpler than weighing infringing uses against non-
infringing uses. Both standards involve a certain amount of subjectivity, speculation, and
unpredictability. Ultimately, a change to the legislative approach in this area is necessary,
see infra Parts VI and VII, but a judicial balancing test is a more appropriate "safety net"
than is the current Sony standard.
146. A failure to consider potential non-infringing uses would smother new
technologies before they are given a chance to evolve. This is a major flaw of the Aimster
standard. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 653. Sony, on the other hand, explicitly included such a
consideration. 464 U.S. at 442. It is important to note that evaluation of potential non-
infringing uses is, by nature, only speculative. A list of non-exclusive factors to consider in
giving weight to potential non-infringing uses could include whether such uses: 1) have
been identified by the defendant prior to litigation; 2) were considered in the design of the
product; 3) would serve valuable needs unmet by other existing technologies; 4) have ever
actually been employed in using the product.
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step of the test. As defendants will be in the best position to
determine how infringing uses could be reduced, it is proper to place
on them the burden of showing disproportionate costs. Once again, in
determining whether reducing infringement would be
disproportionately costly, measures that would impair non-infringing
uses should not be considered. For instance, Grokster and
StreamCast should not be expected to impose filters that would
prevent the sharing of copyrighted works if the filter would also
prevent the flow of public domain materials. Otherwise, copyright
holders would have the ability to unduly inhibit non-infringing
activities, as well as the technologies that facilitate them. Such a result
was clearly not intended by either the Constitution or the Copyright
Act of 1976.
C. A Judicial Balancing Test is Ultimately Inadequate
The major drawback of this judicial approach and others is that
the foundation on which they are based fails to address the current
realities of copyright ownership. Ultimately, the current copyright
system will not offer us the best solution to the file-sharing problem.
The revised judicial approach outlined above may, in fact, achieve an
appropriate balance between technology and music. However,
neither this approach nor any other under the current system will
offer the most effective means for promoting progress in either of
these fields.
VI. A New Legal Framework is Required
In the file-sharing context, even an "appropriate" application of
the Copyright Act fails to equitably promote progress in science and
the useful arts. This failure is exhibited by Napster, Aimster, Grokster,
and by the reactions of technology developers and artists alike. First,
there are strong indicators that as the system currently functions,
musical artists are not sufficiently compensated for their sound
recordings.'47 The financial compensation of artists was purportedly
one of the primary reasons for enacting the Copyright Act, which was
designed to offer a financial incentive to create. If this compensation
is not taking place, the incentive-based structure of the system
collapses. Thus, under its own rationale, the Copyright Act as it
currently functions does not promote progress.
147. See, e.g., Chuck Philips, Auditors Put New Spin on Revolt Over Royalties, L.A.
TIMES, February 26, 2002, at Al.
In addition, the direct relationship between a vibrant public
domain and progress in the field of music cannot be overestimated. It
has been widely acknowledged that the continued application of the
Copyright Act in combination with the DMCA unduly inhibits access
to the creative works of musicians.'4 Indeed, the DMCA was
explicitly designed to inhibit access.149 Although the compensation of
artists has been cited as the primary justification for strengthening
such provisions, whether such compensation actually occurs remains
suspect."5
Furthermore, by combining the legal incentive to inhibit access
with the reality that 85% of copyrighted musical works lie in the
hands of only five corporations,15' otherwise known as "the Big Five,"
current copyright law stands on even weaker ground. Needless to say,
this extreme concentration of ownership threatens to turn online
music distribution into a noncompetitive enterprise. By controlling
such a large percentage of copyrighted musical content, the Big Five
can exert significant control over which online outlets will become
popular and how they will operate. However, because these particular
copyright owners maintain a fundamental interest in controlling what
musical content becomes popular, enhanced-access models will likely
be discouraged. Consequentially, the vibrancy of our public domain
will be compromised, and musical innovation as a whole will suffer.
To illustrate, online music sites will only be able to employ
innovative distribution models that enhance access if the Big Five
agree to license their music under such systems. However, in their
natural attempt to maintain control over the market for musical
content, these companies can leverage their valuable content licenses
in such a way that minimizes the impact of works controlled by
smaller companies and independent artists. This will, in turn, frustrate
attempts by artists and consumers to find "alternative" musical works,
attempts that could be made easier with the use of file-sharing
technologies. Thus, the current system inherently forces the free flow
of musical ideas into a monopolized bottleneck. This was not what the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when giving Congress the
power to grant copyrights. Stacking these major flaws on top of one
148. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Dunwody Distinguished Lecture in Law: The Creative
Commons, 55 FLA. L. REv. 763,764-66 (2003).
149. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (2003).
150. Supra note 147 and accompanying text.
151. Matthew Fagin et. al., Article, Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance
Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 451, 467 (2002).
20041 PICKING UP THE PIECES OF GROKSTER
164 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [27:1
another, copyright law, as it currently functions, appears to be grossly
counterproductive with respect to its original purpose.
The above arguments focus primarily on the elements of
copyright law that affect innovation in music. When the analysis turns
to how copyright law inhibits progress in the field of technology, the
argument in favor of the current copyright system breaks down even
further. Any limitation of Sony, which as argued above is necessary to
protect copyrights in digital musical recordings, necessarily runs the
risk of curtailing technologies capable of substantial non-infringing
uses. Thus, the list of arguments against our current copyright laws
grows longer still. Even under a carefully crafted balancing test,
limiting the staple of article of commerce doctrine set forth in Sony
promises to hinder innovation in the field of technology.
VII. Potential Legislative Approaches to File Sharing
Once again, responsibility for the current shortcomings of our
legal system with respect to promoting progress in science and the
useful arts does not rest solely on the shoulders of the judiciary. On
the other hand, these shortcomings are not entirely the fault of the
legislature either. Even if copyright law had somehow been perfectly
tailored to meet the needs of the day, the problem remains that not
all changes in technology are foreseeable. These changes occur
largely without the input of Congress, which is, of course, generally a
good thing. Nevertheless, copyright has consistently changed to meet
new technological advances and should continue to do so now.
Critics may argue that a fundamental change to the current
copyright system is too difficult, citing the need for cooperation
among interested parties. Indeed, an adequate voluntary collective
licensing system similar to the plan advocated by the Electronic
Frontier Foundation would be ideal.'52 However, it is unclear whether
the recording industry will participate in such a plan. If it does not,
Congress must step in to implement a "plan B.' 53  The
disproportionate lobbying power of a particular group has never been
a valid excuse to ignore the policy behind the Constitution. A
152. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary
Collective Licensing for Music File Sharing, at http://www.eff.org/share/
collectivelic-wp.pdf (last visited Sept. 13, 2004). Under the EFF system, the recording
industry itself would set up a collecting agent. This agent would collect a monthly fee from
Internet service providers, online music sites, or directly from consumers in exchange for
the ability to download music freely from the Internet. The collecting agency would then
distribute collected monies to copyright holders based on the popularity of their respective
works, by anonymous monitoring and through a Nielsen-type rating system.
153. This possibility was addressed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Id. at 4-5.
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constitutional mandate should compel us to adopt a workable and fair
system that reflects the policy of promoting progress in science and in
the useful arts. Naturally, the main objections will come from the
recording industry. However, the industry's interests are not
necessarily in line with the interests of progress. In fact, the evidence
suggests they are not. Ultimately, the law should follow the
Constitution, and not merely the business objectives of the recording
industry.
A. Appropriate Policy Considerations
The following is a list of primary guidelines to be considered in
crafting future legislation concerning the issue of file sharing. Many of
these considerations have already been addressed in this article, and
many are interrelated. With respect to future legislation in this area,
lawmakers should:
1. Consider the language of the Constitution.
2. Promote the development of innovative musical content.
3. Avoid undue curtailment of technological progress.
4. Consider the effect of legislation on current and potential
means of communication.
5. Avoid conferring automatic monopolies to copyright holders
in non-infringing technologies.
6. Avoid conferring monopolies to copyright holders in the
avenues of digital music distribution.
7. Consider the reasonable desires and expectations of
consumers of digital music recordings.
8. Tailor legislation to fit the file-sharing issue, while
acknowledging its other potential applications.
9. Carefully define any technological standards or requirements
incorporated into legislation.
10. Take into account current legislation in order to strike
irrelevant, unnecessary, contradictory or counterproductive
provisions.
B. An Integrative Approach: The Path of the Problem
The fundamental issue raised by file sharing is that it threatens to
undermine attempts to compensate artists for their creative works. In
turn, this theoretically decreases the incentive to create and fails to
promote progress in the field of music. Taking into account the
principles set forth above, enacting a broader legislative scheme
2004]
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resembling the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA")' 4 seems to
be a good starting point. The AHRA established a framework that
allowed digital copies of sound recordings to be made, but which
required devices allowing such copying to meet certain technological
requirements.'55 The distributors of these devices were then required
to pay a royalty to copyright owners based on the number of devices
sold." 6 Thus, a trade-off between the recording industry and the
technology sector was established. This seemed like a reasonable
solution, but ultimately failed. The AHRA was drafted too narrowly
and, by design, excluded computers from coverage.'57 Thus, soon after
the AHRA was passed in 1992 it became obsolete, as DAT recorders
were replaced by computers with high memory capacity and
broadband Internet access.
Although the 1992 AHRA failed as an effective legislative tool
in this area, its underlying approach to digital audio reproduction
should not be so easily discarded. Nevertheless, in crafting a solution
to the file-sharing issue we must be careful not to repeat the critical
flaws of the original AHRA. Most importantly, as noted in the list of
guidelines above, legislation must not be too specific in its assessment
of recording technologies. On the other hand, the drastic changes in
the field of communication that took place in the mid to late 1990s
may not be repeated for quite some time. Perhaps it is not entirely the
fault of Congress for underestimating the incredible breadth of
possibilities the Internet would allow. Napster was still science fiction
in 1992, and perhaps the argument that the law is too slow for
technology, while undoubtedly true, has been somewhat overstated. 58
An application of the AHRA approach to our topic of file
sharing could take the following shape. Legislation could require all
software and services capable of file sharing to adopt certain
technological tracking mechanisms.'59 These mechanisms would
154. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1010(2003).
155. Id. § 1002.
156. Id. § 1003.
157. Diamond, 180 F.3d at 1078.
158. Although a lack of foresight may be partially to blame, Congress did not exclude
computers from the scope of the AHRA unwittingly. Rather, the computer lobby was
heavily involved in the development of the bill, which probably would have failed to pass
without such an exclusion. Cohen, supra note 2, at 438.
159. These mechanisms could identify the file names of copyrighted songs, while
newer sound recordings could include more sophisticated watermarking technologies.
Alternatively, a diluted tracking system could be utilized to provide ratings similar to
those used in broadcasting. In any event, these tracking mechanisms need not, and indeed
should not, track who is downloading what files. In order to adequately compensate
copyright owners, it is only necessary to determine what sound recordings have been
enable the compensation of copyright owners in proportion to the
popularity of their sound recordings. This incorporated tracking
technology could also be standardized and periodically updated in
order to discourage tampering. Technologies in compliance with
these requirements would be exempt from copyright liability.'6° Those
not in compliance with the modified AHRA would be subject to the
judicial standard for contributory infringement described above. 161 Of
course, those who wish to offer their works free of charge could do so
using the same network, as these files would simply not be tracked.'
62
The modified AHRA model has a number of advantages. First, it
allows for the continuation of the basic peer-to-peer structure, thus
enabling access to the greatest possible number of sound recordings
with minimal transaction costs. Second, it promises to remove the
most problematic element from file sharing, namely, the denial of
financial compensation to the artist. By addressing these two critical
issues, the modified AHRA provides a solid foundation on which to
build. Nevertheless, this solution requires us to look at a new set of
issues.
Perhaps most importantly, an adequate system of compensation
must be established. By maintaining the basic peer-to-peer structure,
the ability to freely copy digitized sound recordings will naturally
continue. However, the legally required tracking mechanism will
enable copyright owners to easily determine when their copyrighted
music has been downloaded. In turn, copyright owners will naturally
demand compensation from the distributors of these file-sharing
technologies. The next step involves determining the appropriate
structure for ensuring this compensation.
One possible solution is the blanket license. Thus, copyright
holders who wish to take advantage of the modified AHRA
compensation provisions must license their works to a closely
regulated clearinghouse similar to ASCAP or BMI.' 63 This
clearinghouse would issue sub-licenses to online music distributors on
a non-discriminatory basis. Sub-licensees would then utilize their
downloaded. Privacy concerns should, therefore, not be an issue.
160. A similar provision is included in the Audio Home Recording Act. 17 U.S.C.A. §
1008 (2003).
161. Supra Part V.A.
162. Once again, a similar provision is included in the Audio Home Recording Act. 17
U.S.C.A. § 1002(d)(2) (2003).
163. For a description of these non-profit agencies, see DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL
You NEED To KNoW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 230-35 (1997). The pricing scale for
these licenses could be determined by statute, as is currently the case with mechanical li-
censes, Id. at 210, or by an administrative agency.
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legally required tracking mechanisms in order to ascertain the
appropriate level of payment to the clearinghouse, which would in
turn compensate copyright holders accordingly. Online distributors
could adopt pay-per-play models, subscription services, or other
models not yet devised. The important outcome, however, is that free
competition in the market will reward the best online distribution
models while at the same time compensating the artist.
Another possible approach to the online distribution problem
would be to focus on the antitrust issue.1'6 The particular approach
advocated by Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale, and Kim Weatherall
includes greater involvement by the federal administrative agencies
traditionally responsible for regulating antitrust. 6' Such an approach
would provide yet another useful component to an integrative
solution by ensuring that the Big Five could not monopolize online
music distribution. However, if unauthorized file sharing continues,
and the Grokster ruling indicates that it will, this solution would
remain only partially effective. Administrative agencies like the
Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Copyright Office should instead serve as important supplement to
more fundamental changes in the law. The heightened expertise and
flexible nature of these agencies would permit them to react more
quickly to novel issues arising in the fields of music and technology,
and to adopt more effective means to address such issues.' 66
Other recent proposals addressing the issue of file sharing have
been presented by Professors Shih Ray Ku167 and Neil Weinstock
Netanel,1'6 respectively. In place of the current structure, Professors
Ku and Netanel propose that a levy be imposed on technologies that
contribute to online music distribution 169 or whose value is
substantially enhanced by file sharing. 70 This levy would then be used
to compensate copyright owners proportionally, using tracking or
rating mechanisms to determine the relative popularity of each
respective work.1 7' The levy approach has a number of advantages.
First, it has the simple advantage of being fair, because "free-riding"
164. See generally, Fagin et. al., supra note 151.
165. Id. at 571.
166. Id. at 569-72.
167. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the
New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (2002).
168. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-
to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L & TECH. 1 (2003).
169. Ku, supra note 167, at 313.
170. Netanel, supra note 168, at 4.
171. Id. at 52; Ku, supra note 167, at 313.
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technologies will pay a portion of their proceeds to the artists who are
at least partially responsible for those proceeds. Also, the levy
solution has the advantage of spreading costs across multiple
technologies. Thus, what may seem like an insignificant cost to one
business will, when combined with levies on others, reach a sum
capable of compensating artists appropriately.
On the other hand, the levy solution is not a complete one, and it
has its disadvantages as well. Perhaps most importantly, the cost of
the levy would be passed on to many consumers who do not wish to
use online music services. Although the number of consumers who
fall into this category will inevitably shrink in the future, the
imprecision of a blanket levy on multi-purpose technologies is
problematic. Ultimately, although the shortcomings of a levy-based
approach are not insignificant, either of the proposals outlined above
would constitute a vast improvement over the current legal approach
to file sharing.
V1I1. Conclusion
No solution to the file-sharing problem will be perfect. Legal
solutions inherently contain loopholes, which will always leave room
for piracy. Peer-to-peer file sharing will find a way to thrive, even if
the specific models introduced by Grokster and StreamCast are
ultimately deemed to violate copyright laws. This is so largely because
the existing loopholes have been developed for important public
policy reasons. Current and potential non-infringing uses are
abundant for file-sharing systems, and such systems serve as an
important avenue for communicating ideas. These technologies
should not be automatically shut down merely because they can
potentially be used to infringe copyrights.
Any scheme designed to protect copyrights in music must
promote the progress of science without unduly inhibiting progress in
the useful arts, and vice-versa. The focus of future legal approaches to
file sharing should remain on compensating artists, enhancing access,
and fostering innovative technologies. Ultimately, the various tactics
being employed by the recording industry, namely lawsuits,
advertisements, and anti-piracy technology, may significantly curtail
file sharing. Such an approach is to be expected, and may eventually
lead to a greater understanding of the issues and perhaps even to a
workable system. However, the judiciary and the legislature should
step in to serve the public interest when the tactics of the recording
industry infringe upon the spirit of the Constitution.
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